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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge Michael R. 
Murphy, consolidated two petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
brought by Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr. and then summarily 
dismissed the consolidated case. The named parties to the first 
petition were Mr. Gerrish, petitioner, and Victoria Palacios, 
Paul Boyden, Gary Webster and M. Eldon Barnes, respondents. The 
named parties to the second petition were Mr. Gerrish, 
petitioner, and the State of Utah, M. Eldon Barnes, respondent. 
There were no unnamed parties to either petition. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals summarily affirmed 
the dismissal of at least one of the petitions. The named 
parties to that petition and to the appeal were Mr. Gerrish, 
petitioner and appellant, and the State of Utah, M. Eldon Barnes, 
respondent and appellee. There were no unnamed parties to the 
appeal. 
The subject of the appeal in this Court is the petition 
that named the State of Utah, M. Eldon Barnes, as the respondent. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to sections 78-2-2(5) and 78-2a-4 of the Utah Code 
because the Court granted Mr, Gerrish's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. See Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2-2(5), 78-2a-4 (Supp. 
1991); (see Addenda A [R. 12/90 at 177], B). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the court of appeals and the district 
court err in refusing to consider the merits of Mr. Gerrish's 
habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the petition was 
successive and procedurally barred even though Mr. Gerrish had 
been denied the opportunity to raise his claims in a direct 
appeal and the merits of his claims had never been fully 
considered in prior post-conviction proceedings? 
Standard of Review: Because the district court 
summarily dismissed the petition on procedural grounds, it made 
no factual determinations. And of course, the court of appeals 
made no factual determinations in summarily affirming the 
district court's order of dismissal. Therefore, this issue 
presents questions of law only. This Court should not accord the 
legal conclusions underlying either of the lower courts' 
decisions any deference, but should instead review them for 
correctness. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 
(Utah 1989) . 
2. Issue: Was Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea 
constitutionally defective because it was made with ineffective 
assistance of counsel, where Mr. Gerrish's trial counsel was not 
competent to handle the case and had a conflict of interest? 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a 
question of law only. This Court should determine as a matter of 
law whether the record can support any conclusion other than 
prejudicial ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
3. Issue: Was Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea 
constitutionally defective because it was not made knowingly and 
voluntarily, where the sentencing consequences of the plea were 
not clearly and unequivocally explained to him? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a 
question of law only. This Court should review the explanations 
of the sentence contained in the record and determine whether 
those explanations are sufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., 
State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). 
4. Issue: Was Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea 
constitutionally defective because it was not made knowingly and 
voluntarily, where the State breached its agreement to recommend 
a three year sentence? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a 
question of law only because the record establishes the State's 
agreement and its breach. Therefore, this Court should find that 
the plea was involuntary as a matter of law. Cf., State v. 
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Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988)(if the record is not clear, 
the appellate court should remand for an evidentiary hearing). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part; 
No person shall be . • . deprived of . . . 
liberty . . . without due process of law. 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of . 
. . liberty . . . without due process of law. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
Section 4 of article I of the Utah Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 4. 
Section 7 of article I of the Utah Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
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No person shall be deprived of . . . 
liberty . . . without due process of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, S 7. 
Section 12 of article I of the Utah Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel . . . . 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)(e) provides in 
pertinent part: 
The court . . . may not accept [a guilty] 
plea until the court has found: 
. . . . 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him 
for each offense to which a plea is entered. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal on certiorari from a Utah Court of 
Appeals decision that summarily affirmed the Third Judicial 
District Court, Judge Michael R. Murphy's, summary dismissal of a 
pro se habeas corpus petition filed by petitioner and appellant 
Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr. Both decisions were based on the 
grounds that Mr. Gerrish's attack on his guilty plea was 
successive and procedurally barred. 
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Mr. Gerrish seeks reversal of both the court of 
appeals' and Judge Murphy's decisions on the grounds that unusual 
circumstances require consideration on the merits of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel and other involuntary plea 
claims because he has had no opportunity to raise these claims in 
a direct appeal and their merits have never been fully 
considered. Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea should be vacated and his 
conviction should be reversed because he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel and because his guilty plea was not made 
knowingly and voluntarily. In the alternative, Mr. Gerrish's 
habeas corpus petition should be remanded to the district court 
with the following instructions. The district court should grant 
Mr. Gerrish's appointed pro bono counsel leave to amend the 
petition. After amendment, the district court should hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Gerrish received 
ineffective assistance of counsel and whether his guilty plea was 
made knowingly and voluntarily. 
Nature of Proceedings Below 
Judge Murphy consolidated two habeas corpus petitions 
filed by Mr. Gerrish and then dismissed the consolidated case on 
two grounds. First, Judge Murphy concluded that the attack on 
Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea raised by one of the petitions should 
have been raised on direct appeal and that no unusual 
circumstances justified Mr. Gerrish's failure to do so. Second, 
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Judge Murphy concluded that the petition was successive without 
good cause because Mr, Gerrish had previously filed two other 
habeas corpus petitions. (See Addenda C-H [R. 2/91 at 2-18, R. 
12/90 at 2-8, id- at 143-44, id. at 153, id. at 23-34, id. at 
167-68]). 
Even though Judge Murphy entered two different orders 
of dismissal, neither refers to the other petition, which 
challenged a board of pardons action. (See Addenda D-G). That 
makes some sense because the State opposed the petition 
challenging the board action on the merits rather than on 
procedural grounds. (See Addendum I [R. 12/90 at 12-18]). For 
these reasons, it is not clear whether Judge Murphy intended to 
dismiss both petitions when he summarily dismissed the 
consolidated case. At any rate, the appeal from that dismissal 
appears to have been limited to the petition attacking the guilty 
plea.1 (See Addenda C, J, K [R. 12/90 at 170-71]). 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in a 
per curiam opinion, on its own motion for summary disposition. 
(See Addendum K). Contrary to the district court's ruling, the 
court of appeals did not state that Mr. Gerrish should have 
xThis appeal is similarly limited to the habeas corpus 
petition attacking the guilty plea, not only because that was the 
only petition considered in the court of appeals, but also because 
that was the only petition of the two consolidated petitions that 
was placed in issue by Mr. Gerrish's pro se petition for a writ of 
certiorari. (See Addendum B). 
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attacked his guilty plea on direct appeal. Instead, it held that 
he had "pursued the same ground for relief in a prior 
adjudication" and had "not demonstrated unusual circumstances 
that warrant relitigation of the same ground for relief." (Id.). 
The court of appeals based that conclusion on the following 
observations. Mr. Gerrish had filed a previous habeas corpus 
petition attacking his guilty plea that was summarily dismissed 
on procedural grounds. (See id.). Mr. Gerrish had appealed that 
dismissal and this Court had dismissed the appeal for lack of 
prosecution. (See id..)* Mr* Gerrish had also moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea. (See id.). The district court had denied the 
motion and the court of appeals had summarily affirmed its 
denial. (See id.). 
Statement of Facts 
The Arrest and Conviction 
Mr. Gerrish was arrested for aggravated sexual abuse of 
a child in violation of section 76-5-404.1 of the Utah Code on or 
about August 29, 1985. (See Addenda L, M at 50). Shortly before 
his arrest, Mr. Gerrish discussed the matter with his neighbor 
Harlan Y. Hammond, an attorney engaged in corporate, domestic, 
and estate-planning work. (Addendum M at 14-17). Even though 
Mr. Hammond had virtually no experience in criminal defense work 
and was a member of the same ward, or congregation, of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the "LDS Church") as the 
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alleged victims, he offered to represent Mr. Gerrish in entering 
a guilty plea.2 (Addendum M at 14-16, 25, 33-34). Mr. Gerrish 
accepted the offer. 
Mr. Hammond then appeared for Mr. Gerrish at his 
circuit court arraignment on September 11, 1985 and waived a 
preliminary hearing. (Addenda M at 17-18, Mc). Mr. Gerrish was 
bound over to the Third Judicial District Court where the case 
was assigned to Judge Timothy R. Hanson. (See Addenda Mc, N). 
Before Mr. Gerrishfs district court arraignment, Mr. 
Hammond discussed a proposed plea agreement with two different 
prosecutors, Leslie A. Lewis and Karen Knight-Eagan. (See 
Addenda M at 20, N at 4). The substance of the proposed 
agreement was that Mr. Gerrish would plead guilty to one count of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child in exchange for dismissal of 
the two remaining counts, assurances that other charges then 
known to the prosecutors would not be filed, and that the 
prosecutors would recommend a sentence of three years. (See 
Addenda M at 20-22, 0). Mr. Hammond relayed these terms to Mr. 
Gerrish, who agreed to them. (See Addendum M at 22). Both Mr. 
Hammond and Mr. Gerrish understood the promised three year 
2Mr. Hammond testified several years later that he would not 
have offered to represent Mr. Gerrish had he thought that the 
representation would require a "complete defense." (Addendum M at 
16). 
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sentence to mean that Mr. Gerrish would serve only three years. 
(Addendum M at 21-22, 48). 
On September 23, 1985, Mr. Hammond appeared on behalf 
of Mr. Gerrish at his district court arraignment. Although the 
case had been assigned to Ms. Lewis, Ms. Knight-Eagan appeared 
for the State. (Addenda L, N at 4). The plea agreement was 
discussed briefly at that hearing, but no plea was entered. Mr. 
Hammond, unaware of the need for a plea affidavit, had not 
prepared one and failed to return to the courtroom following a 
recess that had been granted for the purpose of preparing an 
affidavit. (See Addenda M at 23, N). The arraignment was 
continued to September 25, 1985. By that time, the plea 
affidavit had been prepared by Mr. Hammond, with interlineations 
apparently made by Ms. Knight-Eagan, and had been signed by Mr. 
Gerrish. (See Addenda M at 44-45, 0, P). 
The plea affidavit was, however, incorrect in two very 
important respects. First, it did not accurately state the 
sentence that could be imposed under section 76-5-404.1, a 
minimum mandatory term of three, six or nine years. See Utah 
Code Ann. $ 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1986); id. (Supp. 1985); id. (Supp. 
1984), (attached as Addendum Q). Instead, it inexplicably stated 
that the permissible sentence was a minimum mandatory term of 
five, ten or fifteen years. (Addendum 0). Second, it failed to 
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state the third condition for the plea, the promise to recommend 
a three year sentence. (Addendum 0). 
The confusion about the sentence continued during the 
plea hearing on September 25, 1985. Judge Hanson repeated the 
affidavit's erroneous statement that the permissible sentence was 
a minimum mandatory term of five, ten or fifteen years. No one 
mentioned the promised three year sentence. (See Addenda M at 
25, P at 2-11). Although the reasons for Mr. Hammond's silence 
or the prosecutors'3 silence are not known, one of the reasons 
for Mr. Gerrish's silence is. He believed that he should not 
mention the promised sentence, because Judge Hanson already knew 
all about it. (See Addendum M at 48-49). 
Mr. Gerrish pled guilty to one count of aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child. Mr. Hammond requested a presentence 
report and sentencing was set for October 21, 1985. (See 
Addendum P at 2-11). 
The Sentence and Appeal 
The confusion surrounding the sentence continued 
throughout the sentencing hearing. There was some discussion 
that the permissible sentence might actually be a minimum 
mandatory term of eight, thirteen or eighteen years. (See 
Addendum P at 16-19). Ms. Knight-Eagan requested that Judge 
3The State was represented at that hearing by E. Neil 
Gunnarson and Ms. Knight-Eagan. (Addendum P). 
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Hanson impose what she apparently believed was the shortest 
permissible sentence, a minimum mandatory sentence of five years. 
(Id. at 20-21). Judge Hanson then sentenced Mr. Gerrish to a 
minimum mandatory term of ten years, citing a lack of mitigating 
factors sufficient to justify a shorter term. (.Id. at 21-22). 
Following the imposition of that ten year sentence, Mr. 
Gerrish asked Mr. Hammond what had happened to his three year 
sentence. (Addendum M at 39). Mr. Hammond "responded that the 
court had entered its edict." (Id. at 39-40). 
By a letter dated November 5, 1985, the Utah Board of 
Pardons notified Judge Hanson that section 76-5-404.1 did not 
permit the ten year sentence imposed and asked him to correct the 
sentence. (Addendum R). Judge Hanson amended the sentence on 
November 15, 1985 to a minimum mandatory term of six years 
without Mr. Gerrish or counsel present. (Addenda S, T at 4). 
On February 18, 1986, Judge Hanson held another 
sentencing hearing, sua sponte. (See Addendum T at 4). Mr. 
Gerrish was present and was represented by appointed counsel, Jo 
Carol Nesset-Sale. (See id. at 3-5). Ernest W. Jones 
represented the State. (See Addendum T). Ms. Nesset-Sale had 
previously filed a motion to declare the minimum mandatory 
sentencing scheme of section 76-5-404.1 unconstitutional. (See 
id. at 5). That motion was argued briefly and denied. (See id. 
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at 5-9). Judge Hanson resentenced Mr. Gerrish to a minimum 
mandatory term of six years. (Addendum T at 9). 
Ms. Nesset-Sale then brought an appeal from the denial 
of that motion on Mr. Gerrishfs behalf. (See Addendum U [R. 
12/90 at 57-72]). This Court upheld the sentence as 
constitutional. See State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987). 
The Prior Habeas Corpus Petitions 
In the spring or summer of 1987, Mr. Gerrish filed a 
pro se habeas corpus petition in the Third Judicial District 
Court. (Addendum V [R. 12/90 85-92]). The grounds for that 
petition included the bases for this appeal, ineffective 
assistance of counsel and an involuntary guilty plea. (See id.). 
On or about September 16, 1987, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Gerrish had not 
previously moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (See Addendum W 
[R. 12/90 at 94-95]). 
Shortly after Judge Wilkinson had dismissed that habeas 
corpus petition, Mr. Gerrish filed a pro se motion, dated 
September 26, 1987, in this Court seeking reversal of his 
conviction and sentence on the same grounds. (Addendum XY [R. 
12/90 at 74-78]). On October 19, 1987, this Court dismissed that 
motion, referring to it as a habeas corpus petition. (Addendum Z 
[R. 12/90 at 80]). 
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Mr. Gerrish then attempted to appeal from Judge 
Wilkinson's decision by filing a pro se notice of appeal and a 
pro se petition for interlocutory appeal, both dated January 24, 
1988. (Addendum 1 [R. 12/90 at 97-100]). This Court denied the 
petition for interlocutory appeal and dismissed the appeal 
commenced by the untimely notice. (Addendum 2 [R. 12/90 at 102, 
104]). 
In 1988, Mr. Gerrish filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. (See Addendum 3 [R. 12/90 at 106-07, 109-19]). 
The grounds for that petition also included the bases for this 
appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary 
guilty plea. (See id. at 6). On May 3, 1989, the federal court 
dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Gerrish had not 
exhausted his state court remedies because the only issue ever 
resolved by this Court was the constitutionality of the minimum 
mandatory sentencing scheme. (See id. at 6-9). 
Immediately following the dismissal of that petition in 
1989, Mr. Gerrish filed another pro se habeas corpus petition, 
dated May 24, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(Addendum 4 [R. 12/90 at 121-28]). The grounds for that petition 
again included the bases for this appeal, ineffective assistance 
of counsel and breach of a plea agreement. (See id. at 2-5). 
Judge John A. Rokich dismissed the petition as successive and 
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procedurally barred. (Addendum 5 [R. 12/90 at 130-32]). 
Although Mr. Gerrish apparently filed a pro se appeal of Judge 
Rokich's decision, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of 
prosecution. (See Addendum 6 [R. 12/90 at 134]). 
The Bar Disciplinary Proceedings 
Mr. Gerrish sent a letter of complaint against his 
trial counsel, Mr. Hammond, to the Utah State Bar. (See Addendum 
7). In response to that complaint, the Screening Panel of the 
Bar's Ethics and Discipline Committee found that Mr. Hammond had 
violated two ethical rules in his representation of Mr. Gerrish. 
(Id.). Mr. Hammond violated the rule that prohibits lawyers from 
handling matters that they know or should know they are not 
competent to handle. (id.). "Mr. Hammond was not sufficiently 
familiar with the criminal law relating to your sexual abuse 
charge and the sentencing phase." (id.). Mr. Hammond also 
violated the rule that prohibits lawyers from handling matters 
when they have conflicts of interest. (id.). "Mr. Hammond 
displayed some bias about the ultimate sentencing outcome of the 
criminal charge against you and . . . improperly confused his 
professional role and his ecclesiastical role and failed to act 
properly in his role as an attorney." (id.). As a result of 
these violations, Mr. Hammond received a private reprimand. (See 
id., Addendum M at 32-33). 
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The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea 
After learning the outcome of the Bar proceedings, Mr. 
Gerrish filed a pro se motion to set aside his guilty plea, dated 
May 6, 1989. (Addendum 8 [R. 12/90 at 136]). After appointing 
counsel for Mr. Gerrish and holding an evidentiary hearing, Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson denied that motion. The grounds for denial 
were that upon "review of the record as a whole . . . the Court 
is satisfied that the defendant entered his plea knowingly, 
intelligently with full understanding of the rights that he was 
giving up, and of the potential consequences of the entry of the 
plea." (Addendum 9 at 2, 3 [R. 12/90 at 138-41]). (See Addenda 
M, 8, 9). Mr. Gerrish appealed Judge Hanson's decision to this 
Court. (See Addendum 10). On appeal, Mr. Gerrish argued that 
the "record as a whole" test was not the correct standard. (See 
id.). This Court assigned the appeal to the court of appeals, 
which summarily affirmed. (See id.). Shortly after Judge Hanson 
denied Mr. Gerrish's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. 
Gerrish filed the habeas corpus petition that gave rise to this 
appeal. (See Addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Gerrish's case has more closely resembled a plot 
concocted by Franz Kafka than a fair judicial proceeding. Since 
Mr. Gerrish first entered his plea almost six years ago, the 
merits of its constitutional validity have received only one 
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rather abbreviated hearing. At almost every turn, Mr. Gerrish's 
claims have been denied consideration on conflicting and 
confusing procedural grounds. It is time that those claims be 
given a full and fair hearing. 
Mr. Gerrish's plea was involuntary for three reasons. 
It was made with the ineffective assistance of counsel who was 
incompetent to handle the case and who had a conflict of 
interest. The sentence that could actually be imposed as a 
consequence of his guilty plea was not clearly and unequivocally 
explained to Mr. Gerrish. The State breached its agreement to 
recommend a three year sentence in exchange for the plea. 
Because Mr. Gerrish has already spent approximately six years in 
prison on the basis of that constitutionally defective guilty 
plea, this Court should vacate the plea anrf reverse his 
conviction, with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Mr. Gerrish's Petitions Must be Decided on the 
Merits Because he had no Opportunity to Raise his 
Claims on Direct Appeal and They Have not Been 
Fully Considered in any Other Proceeding. 
"Habeas corpus proceedings may be used to attack a 
judgment or conviction on the ground that an obvious injustice or 
a substantial denial of a constitutional right occurred at 
trial." Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)(citing 
Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Turner, 
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968)). A habeas corpus 
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petition may properly raise a claim that the petitioner was 
denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel at trial and on appeal. See, e.g., Dunn v. Cook. 791 
P.2d 873 (Utah 1990); Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619 (Utah 
1989)("if counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to 
deprive the plaintiff of effective assistance of counsel, they 
constitute a violation of due process that is clearly reviewable 
by habeas corpus"); Fernandez, 783 P.2d 547. A habeas corpus 
petition may also properly raise a claim that due process was 
denied because a plea agreement was breached or was involuntary 
because the benefits of the plea were not clearly explained. 
See, e.g., Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979); Summers 
v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Absent "unusual circumstances," however, a petitioner 
may not raise issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or 
should have been raised in a direct appeal. See, e.g., 
Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549 (citing Bundv, 763 P.2d at 804; Wells 
v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Utah 1983); Brown, 21 Utah 2d at 98-99, 
440 P.2d at 969). Denial of the opportunity to raise an issue in 
a direct appeal constitutes an "unusual circumstance" that 
justifies raising the issue for the first time in a habeas corpus 
petition. E.g., Dunn, 791 P.2d 873; Jensen, 795 P.2d 619; 
Fernandez, 783 P.2d 547; Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 
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1980); Waastaff v, Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Such a denial occurs when a petitioner's trial counsel advises 
against an appeal and the petitioner follows that advice. E.g., 
Chess, 617 P.2d 341. The same denial occurs even if the 
petitioner does bring an appeal and even if the petitioner is 
represented by different attorneys at trial and on appeal, if 
appellate counsel advises against raising a claim and the advice 
is followed. E.g., Jensen, 795 P.2d 619. 
Although Mr. Gerrish's petition attacks his conviction 
on the ground that his constitutional rights to the effective 
assistance of counsel and due process were violated, the petition 
was dismissed because those issues could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal. The district court erred in dismissing 
the petition on that basis because Mr. Gerrish never had the 
opportunity to raise the issues in a direct appeal. 
As the federal court has noted, Mr. Gerrish never 
actually had a direct appeal. (Addendum 3 at 2 n.l). His trial 
counsel was not willing to represent him on appeal and advised 
against an appeal. (Addendum M at 51). Mr. Gerrish followed 
that advice. (Id. at 70). Under Chess, Mr. Gerrish was thus 
denied the opportunity to raise his claims on direct appeal. 
That denial constitutes an unusual circumstance that justifies 
raising those claims for the first time in a habeas corpus 
petition. 
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The appeal concerning Mr. Gerrish's case that this 
Court has previously resolved was not a direct appeal, but an 
appeal from denial of a motion to declare minimum mandatory 
sentencing unconstitutional. After the error in Mr. Gerrish's 
sentence was discovered, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale was appointed to 
represent him on resentencing. (See Addendum T). Prior to the 
hearing on resentencing, Ms. Nesset-Sale filed a motion to 
declare the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme of Utah Code 
section 76-5-404.1 unconstitutional. (See Addenda T, U). The 
trial court denied the motion and sentenced Mr. Gerrish to a 
minimum mandatory term of six years to life. (See Addendum T). 
Ms. Nesset-Sale then filed an appeal from the denial of the 
motion. (See Addendum U). 
There is no indication that Ms. Nesset-Sale was 
appointed to represent Mr. Gerrish for any other purpose or that 
Ms. Nesset-Sale and Mr. Gerrish ever discussed any other issues. 
In fact, Mr. Gerrish never saw or spoke with Ms. Nesset-Sale 
except at the resentencing hearing. (See Addendum M at 69-70). 
Thus, Ms. Nesset-Sale's appointment did not afford Mr. Gerrish 
any opportunity to raise his claims on direct appeal. This 
situation is somewhat analogous to that in Jensen, where new 
appellate counsel advised against raising a claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective, because the context of Ms. Nesset-Sale's 
appointment effectively foreclosed raising a similar claim or any 
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claim other than the challenge to the constitutionality of 
minimum mandatory sentencing. 
Just as "unusual circumstances" are required to justify 
habeas corpus review of issues that should have been raised on 
direct appeal, "good cause" is required to justify habeas corpus 
review of issues that should have been raised in a prior habeas 
corpus or other similar proceeding. State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 
894 (Utah 1988)(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(2), (4)). The 
standards imposed by both the "unusual circumstances" and "good 
cause" requirements appear to be the same. E.g., West, 765 P.2d 
at 893-95; Dunn, 791 P.2d at 879 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in 
the result). 
Mr. Gerrish has filed several pro se petitions for 
habeas corpus and made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
(See Addenda V, XY, 3, 4, 8). Not one of those habeas corpus 
petitions has been considered on the merits. (See Addenda W, Z, 
3, 5). His pro se attempts to appeal the summary dismissals of 
those petitions have met with no success. (See Addenda 1, 2, 6). 
He was represented on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 
an evidentiary hearing was held. (See Addendum M). However, as 
the transcript of that hearing and Judge Hanson's memorandum 
decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrate, 
the issues raised in Mr. Gerrish's petitions were not fully 
considered. (See Addenda 9). For example, even though the issue 
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of Mr. Hammond's conflict of interest was raised, it was not 
dealt with at all. (See Addendum M at 16, 25, 32). Mr. Gerrish 
filed a pro se appeal from the denial of that motion, but did not 
base the appeal on any grounds relevant to the issues raised in 
the habeas corpus petition in the present case. (See Addendum 
10). 
It would be unfair and absurd to expect someone in Mr. 
Gerrish's position to have the ability to state and pursue his 
claims properly without the assistance of counsel. This Court 
should not hold that Mr. Gerrish's prior efforts to do so 
foreclose the opportunity to have his claims properly presented 
by counsel for full and fair consideration. 
2. Mr. Gerrish's Guilty Plea was not Made Knowingly 
and Voluntarily Because he Received Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel as a Result of his Lawyer's 
Conflict of Interest and Incompetence. 
The sixth amendment to the United State Constitution 
and section 12 of article I of the Utah Constitution guarantee 
the right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal 
prosecutions. See, e.g.. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 877 (Utah 
1990); U.S. Const, amend. VI.; Utah Const, art. I, S 12. 
Challenges to convictions based on ineffectiveness of counsel are 
evaluated under the following two-part test: (1) did counsel 
render "a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment," and (2) did "counsel's performance 
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[prejudice] the defendant.- Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988Uciting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 
(1984)). The same test applies when the conviction is based on a 
guilty plea. E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
Generally, this Court will not consider the 
reasonableness of counsel's performance without first determining 
that the defendant was prejudiced. See State v. Archuletta, 747 
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987). However, if a defendant 
demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting 
interests" and "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected 
his lawyer's performance," this Court must presume prejudice.4 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 350 (1980)). 
4The reasons for presuming prejudice when there is an actual 
conflict of interest are fundamental. 
In those circumstances, counsel breaches the 
duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of 
counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult 
to measure the precise effect on the defense 
of representation corrupted by conflicting 
interests. Given the obligation of counsel 
to avoid conflicts of interest and the 
ability of trial courts to make early inquiry 
in certain situations likely to give rise to 
conflicts, . . . it is reasonable for the 
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly 
rigid rule of presumed prejudice for 
conflicts of interest. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (citing Cuvler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)). 
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Under that rule, the Court should presume prejudice in 
this case because Mr. Hammond actively represented the interest 
of the alleged victims and their parents in obviating the need 
for the children to testify. As Mr. Hammond has testified, he 
lived in the same neighborhood and attended the same LDS Church 
congregation as did the alleged victims and their parents. 
(Addendum M at 25). Although he did not recall being acquainted 
with the children, he knew their parents. (id.). In 
disciplinary proceedings that arose from Mr. Hammond's 
representation of Mr. Gerrish, the Utah State Bar appears to have 
determined that Mr. Hammond held an ecclesiastical office that 
resulted in conflicting duties to the alleged victims and Mr. 
Gerrish. (See Addendum 7). The Bar also appears to have 
determined that Mr. Hammond confused his roles as Mr. Gerrish's 
ecclesiastical and legal adviser. (id.). The Bar further 
determined that these conflicts adversely affected Mr. Hammond's 
performance, noting that Mr. Hammond was "biased" about the 
sentence.5 (id.). 
5A1 though bar disciplinary action does not, without more, 
require a conclusion of ineffectiveness, e.g., United States v. 
Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1986), when a lawyer is 
reprimanded for the very conduct in question, it is evidence that 
the lawyer's performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 688 ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar 
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining 
what is reasonable, but they are only guides."); Schoonover v. 
State, 218 Kan. 377, 543 P.2d 881, 886, cert, denied, 424 U.S. 944 
(1975). Violation of ethical rules, especially the rule against 
representing conflicting interests, tends to "show actual errors 
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Mr. Hammond even indicated that in his view, one of the 
main reasons for Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea was to prevent the 
alleged victims from having to testify. (Addendum M at 16, 36). 
While this may have been Mr. Hammond's priority in his 
ecclesiastical role and certainly would have been the priority of 
the children and their parents, it is not plausible that it was 
Mr. Gerrish's main concern to the exclusion of all others. 
Although Mr. Hammond attempted to attribute the same priority to 
Mr. Gerrish, he admitted that Mr. Gerrish had not expressed it as 
his overriding concern. (Id.). 
These conflicts resulted in Mr. Hammond's cavalier 
attitude about representing Mr. Gerrish in general and 
specifically about the sentence that Mr. Gerrish would and did 
receive on pleading guilty. (See Addendum M at 16, 36, 40-41). 
As demonstrated below in part 3 of this argument, Mr. Hammond 
failed to determine or explain to Mr. Gerrish what sentence could 
actually be imposed. There can be no justification for a 
lawyer's failing to study and explain the statute under which a 
client has been charged. Therefore, this Court should not only 
presume prejudice, it should also find Mr. Hammond's 
representation deficient and should vacate Mr. Gerrish's guilty 
plea on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
and omissions by counsel that a conscientious advocate would not 
have made, and which prejudiced" the defendant. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 
at 696; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
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There is an independent reason, based on state 
constitutional grounds, that this Court should find Mr. Hammond's 
representation deficient and presume prejudice. Mr. Hammond's 
representation of conflicting interests with religious overtones 
in a State criminal prosecution violates section 4 of article I 
of the Utah Constitution. That provision prohibits religious 
domination of or interference in state functions. Utah Const, 
art. I, S 4. 
In addition to serving as a client's advocate, every 
attorney is an officer of the court. E.g., Barnard v. Utah State 
Bar, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (No. 880201 Mar. 21, 1991). An 
attorney who represents a defendant in a criminal prosecution 
conducted by the State in state court plays a very important role 
in one of the State's most important and serious functions. 
Therefore, the plain language of section 4 and common sense both 
demand that a defendant's attorney perform this role without 
church-based conflicts of interest. When a defendant's attorney 
violates this principle, this Court should find that attorney's 
performance deficient, should presume prejudice and should vacate 
the defendant's guilty plea or conviction. Any other rule would 
allow the religious interference that section 4 prohibits. 
Both the Utah history behind section 4 and sound public 
policy support the same rule. Prior to statehood, Utah was to a 
certain extent a church-state. See E. Firmage & R. Mangrum, Zion 
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in the Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-dav Saints, 1830-1900 263-78 (1988)(attached as Addendum 
11). During this period, the LDS Church strongly promoted 
arbitration and mediation of disputes. (Id. at 262-78). The LDS 
Church had its own legal system and strongly discouraged its 
members from resorting to secular courts. (JEd. at 263-78). This 
was true even in criminal matters. (Id. at 267). The church 
legal system was a mechanism for the LDS Church to exert great 
influence in secular affairs. The church courts heard complaints 
against LDS civil officials and then issued decrees instructing 
them on the proper performance of their civil duties in 
accordance with church teachings, (id. at 276-78). This 
situation was considered unfair by some church members as well as 
nonmembers. (.Id. at 263-78). 
When Utah was accepted as a state, it included section 
4 in its constitution, purportedly ending the uneasy union 
between church and state. But religion, and especially the LDS 
Church, continues to play an important role in Utah today. For 
example, a recent "Time" magazine article entitled "Mixing 
Business and Faith," (attached as Addendum 12), gives the LDS 
Church much of the credit for Utah's healthy economy. The 
article also points out, however, that not every aspect of the 
LDS Church's influence is welcome to all Utah residents or 
attracts new residents. (Id.). Other reports, such as a 
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February 1990 article in "Modern Brewery Age,H (attached as 
Addendum 13), point out that the LDS Church still exerts 
considerable influence in Utah politics. 
While church influence in business and politics may 
reasonably be viewed as constitutionally permissible and fair, 
LDS Church influence in Utah's courts can only be viewed as 
unconstitutional and fundamentally unfair. Based on Utah's early 
history, section 4 must have been intended to do away with any 
such influence. Moreover, sound public policy requires legal 
rules that promote public faith in the fairness of the judicial 
system. Given the ever-present threat of unfair church influence 
inherent in Utah's current demographic makeup, this Court should 
enforce the spirit and letter of section 4 by sending a strong 
signal that no such influence will be tolerated in Utah's courts. 
This Court cannot send that signal if it allows Mr. Gerrish's 
guilty plea to stand. 
Even if this Court chooses not to presume that Mr. 
Hammond's conflict of interest prejudiced Mr. Gerrish, the record 
shows that Mr. Hammond's failure to determine and explain what 
sentence Mr. Gerrish would face upon pleading guilty prejudiced 
him. Mr. Gerrish has repeatedly stated that he would have 
insisted on a trial had he known that his sentence would be more 
than three years. (See, e.g., Addenda B at 8, M at 52-54). Mr. 
Gerrish has also consistently stated that he would have asked for 
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court appointed counsel had he known that Mr. Hammond was not 
competent to handle a criminal matter. (See, e.g., Addendum B at 
8, 4).6 
3. Mr. Gerrish's Guilty Plea was not Made Knowingly 
and Voluntarily Because the Sentence That Would be 
Imposed was not Clearly Explained to him. 
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution and section 7 of article I of the Utah 
Constitution guarantee due process of law in criminal 
proceedings. U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, S 1; 
Utah Const, art. I, S 7, Rule 11(5)(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure is designed to protect that constitutional 
right. See, e.g.. State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464, 464 (Utah 1989). 
Rule 11(5)(e) provides that a court "may not accept" a guilty 
plea until the court has found that "the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is entered." Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(5)(e) (identical in substance to former Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(5), codified at Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(5)(Supp 1985), 
in effect at the time of Mr. Gerrish's plea). This Court has 
held that a defendant's guilty plea is not valid under rule 
11(5)(e) unless the record shows that the defendant "was 
6Mr. Hammond's incompetence is demonstrated below in parts 3 
and 4 of this Argument. The Utah State Bar also found that Mr. 
Hammond was not competent to represent Mr. Gerrish in a criminal 
matter. (Addendum 7). 
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unequivocably and clearly informed about the sentence that would 
be imposed." Smith, 777 P.2d at 466. Unless a defendant has 
been so informed, a guilty plea cannot be knowingly and 
voluntarily made. See id. 
In Smith, this Court vacated the defendant's guilty 
plea and reversed his conviction. 777 P.2d at 464, 466. The 
grounds for reversal were that neither the plea affidavit nor the 
transcript of the plea hearing contained language clearly and 
unequivocally advising the defendant that a guilty plea would 
subject him to a mandatory prison sentence of at least five 
years. See id. at 465. 
The plea affidavit had four deficiencies. First, it 
"used standard language applicable to indeterminate sentences in 
a situation involving a minimum mandatory term." JEd. Such 
language does not clearly state the allowable punishment. Id. 
Second, the plea affidavit was misleading because the phrase 
"possible maximum sentence that can and may be imposed" indicated 
that a sentence shorter than the mandatory term was possible. 
Id. Third, the affidavit's reference to a fine gave the false 
impression that a fine could be imposed instead of a prison term. 
Id. Fourth, the affidavit referred to probation as if it were a 
possibility even though it was not. Id. 
The transcript of the plea hearing also reflected the 
likelihood that the defendant was confused about the sentence. 
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Id, The district judge explained to the defendant that the plea 
Hcould- subject him to a mandatory term of five, ten or fifteen 
years, not that the guilty plea would automatically require him 
to spend at least five years in prison. Id. 
As the following comparison demonstrates, the facts of 
Smith are strikingly similar to the facts of the present case. 
The pertinent portions of the plea affidavit in Smith provided as 
follows: 
I know that under the laws of Utah the 
possible maximum sentence that can and may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty to the charge 
identified on page one of this Affidavit is 
as follows: 
(a) Imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for 
a minimum mandatory term of five, ten, or 
fifteen years and which may be for life. 
(b) And/or fined in any amount not in excess 
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
I am also aware that any charge or sentencing 
concessions or recommendations for probation 
or suspended sentences, including a reduction 
of the charge for sentencing, made or sought 
by either defense counsel or the prosecutor 
are not binding on the court and may not be 
approved or followed by the court. 
777 P.2d at 465 (emphasis added in opinion). The corresponding 
portions of the plea affidavit Mr. Gerrish signed provide as 
follows: 
I have received a copy of the charge 
(Information) and understand that the crime I 
am pleading guilty to is a FIRST DEGREE 
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FELONY and understand that the punishment for 
this crime ma£ be 5, 10, OR 15 YEARS MINIMUM 
MANDATORY prison term, $10,000 fine, or both. 
• • • • 
I am also aware that any charge or sentencing 
concessions or recommendations or probation 
or suspended sentences, including a reduction 
of the charges for sentencing, made or sought 
by either defense counsel or counsel for the 
State, is not binding on the Judge and may 
not be approved by the Judge. 
(Addendum 0). 
Mr. Gerrish's affidavit contains all four of the 
deficiencies identified by this Court in Smith. It uses standard 
language applicable to indeterminate sentences that does not 
clearly state the allowable punishment. It states that the 
punishment "may be" a mandatory term, indicating that a shorter 
sentence was possible. It refers to a fine in the alternative, 
giving the false impression that a fine could be imposed instead 
of a prison term. It refers to probation as if it were a 
possibility when it was not. Mr. Gerrish's affidavit also 
contains another confusing deficiency. It fails to state the 
allowable sentence, a minimum mandatory term of three, six or 
nine years. (See Addenda 0, Q). Instead, it erroneously states 
that the applicable sentence was a minimum mandatory term of 
five, ten or fifteen years. (Addendum 0). 
These ambiguities, together with Mr. Hammond's mistaken 
understanding and advice to Mr. Gerrish about the potential 
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sentence, created an extremely confusing situation. Mr. Hammond 
not only failed to study and explain the applicable sentencing 
scheme under section 76-5-404.1 to Mr. Gerrish, he erroneously 
believed and told Mr. Gerrish that the sentence would be no more 
than three years. (See Addendum M at 19, 21-22, 35, 47-49). The 
confusion was compounded by Mr. Hammond's advice that Mr. Gerrish 
not raise the sentencing issue in court because the Judge knew 
all about the three year sentence. (See id. at 48, 57, 62, 
67).7 Mr. Gerrish simply did not understand what sentence would 
actually be imposed, and the plea hearing did not alleviate his 
confusion. (See id. at 62-64). 
A comparison of the plea hearing transcripts in Smith 
and the present case reveals their similarity, as well as the 
additional confusion in the present case about the sentencing 
provisions of section 76-5-404.1. The transcript in Smith 
contains the following discussion of the sentence: 
With respect to the affidavit, your 
Honor, let me also point out in Paragraph 7 
it specifically indicates that the punishment 
for Count 1 is a minimum mandatory five, ten 
or fifteen to life. 
THE COURT: Do you understand what Mr. 
Oehler has just said? 
JOHN WHITNEY SMITH: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And you 
understand that if you plead guilty to this 
7A court "cannot . . . say that it would be obvious to a 
poorly counseled defendant, that he should mention a supposed 
'deal' with the government, no matter how proper." McAlenev v. 
United States, 539 F.2d 282, 285 (1st Cir. 1976). 
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offense, as is set out in this agreement, you 
could be—submit yourself to an imprisonment 
for a term—mandatory term of five, ten or 
fifteen years up to life in the state 
penitentiary? Do you understand that? 
JOHN WHITNEY SMITH: Yes, your Honor. 
777 P.2d at 465 (emphasis omitted); id* at 467 (Hall, C.J., 
dissenting)(emphasis omitted). The transcript of Mr. Gerrish's 
plea hearing contains the following discussion of the sentence: 
This charge carries, according to the 
statute, a minimum mandatory sentence. Have 
you spoken to Mr. Hammond about the nature of 
the Court's role in sentencing in this 
matter? You understand that absent any 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, this 
Court will sentence you to prison for ten 
years minimum? 
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand if there are 
mitigating circumstances, the Court has the 
option to reduce that to a five-year minimum 
sentence? 
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Or if there are aggravating 
circumstances, to increase that to 15 years 
minimum? 
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand what the 
Court means when I say minimum? That means 
the minimum amount of time you're going to 
spend in the Utah State Prison before you 
could even be considered before parole. Do 
you understand that? 
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, I do. 
(Addendum P at 4). 
Although the transcript of Mr. Gerrish's hearing shows 
a somewhat greater effort to explain the applicable sentencing 
scheme, that effort did not go far enough to remedy the confusion 
created by the ambiguous affidavit and Mr. Hammond's erroneous 
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advice. Like the affidavit, the transcript shows that Mr. 
Gerrish was never told clearly and unequivocally that he would 
certainly spend at least three years in prison and would most 
likely serve at least six years. In fact, Mr. Gerrish believed 
that he would serve no more than three years and, like the 
defendant in Smith, may even have believed that he might not 
serve any time at all. (Addendum M at 21-22, 35, 48). Like many 
unsophisticated litigants, Mr.' Gerrish did not have an 
independent understanding of the court proceedings and court 
documents in his case. Faced with confusing legal explanations 
both in the plea affidavit and in the frightening atmosphere of 
the courtroom, he could focus only on his lawyer's mistaken 
advice and explanations. (See id. at 52, 54, 57, 62-64). On 
these facts, Rule 11(5)(e) and this Court's holding in Smith 
require that Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea be vacated because it was 
not made knowingly and voluntarily. 
4. Mr. Gerrish's Guilty Plea was not Made Knowingly 
and Voluntarily Because the State Breached its 
Promise to Recommend a Three Year Sentence. 
••[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to 
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1275 (Utah 
1988Hquoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). 
If the State breaches a promise, if the promise is illusory or if 
-34-
a defendant pleads guilty "with an exaggerated belief in the 
benefits of his plea," the plea is not knowingly and voluntarily 
made. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273-76. Under any of these 
circumstances, the plea must be vacated. See id. 
All three circumstances exist in the present case. 
First, the State promised to recommend a sentence no harsher than 
a minimum mandatory term of three years. Mr. Heunmond's testimony 
that one of the prosecutors involved in Mr. Gerrish's case 
promised to recommend a three year sentence is uncontroverted. 
(See Addendum M at 21). This testimony is supported by three 
additional facts. The record shows that Mr. Hammond first 
discussed the plea agreement with the prosecutor originally 
assigned to the case, Ms. Lewis, but other prosecutors appeared 
at the plea and sentencing hearings. (See Addenda L, M at 20, N 
at 4, P). A three year minimum mandatory term was the minimum 
sentence allowed under section 76-5-404.1. (Addendum Q). One of 
the prosecutors who appeared at the sentencing hearing, Ms. 
Knight-Eagan, recommended what she mistakenly believed to be the 
minimum allowable sentence, a minimum mandatory term of five 
years. (See Addendum P at 20-21). Thus, even assuming that the 
State's promise was to recommend the three year minimum mandatory 
term provided for by section 76-5-404.1, rather than a term of no 
more than three years as Mr. Hammond and Mr. Gerrish believed, it 
is incontrovertible that the State breached its promise when Ms. 
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Knight-Eagan recommended a minimum mandatory term of five 
years.8 
Second, the State's promise was illusory. Section 76-
3-201(5)(a) of the Utah Code provides that "If a statute under 
which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three 
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added)(identical to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1985), in effect at the time of 
Mr. Gerrish's plea). The transcripts of the plea and sentencing 
hearings demonstrate that Judge Hanson was well aware of this 
requirement and that he followed it. (See Addendum P at 4, 21-
22). Not surprisingly, Judge Hanson determined that the middle 
term was appropriate because the only mitigating factors 
presented to him, Mr. Gerrish's background as a victim of similar 
abuse and Mr. Gerrish's remorse and desire for treatment,9 did 
8The record does not indicate what recommendation may have 
been made in the presentence report. If the report did not make 
the promised recommendation, that failure would also constitute a 
breach of the State's promise. Cf.. State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 
1266, 1274 (Utah 1988)(conflict between recommendations in report 
and sentencing hearing indicated possible confusion about the 
substance of the State's promise). 
9Such mitigating factors have not particularly impressed Utah 
courts. See, e.g., State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) 
(affirming imposition of term of middle severity even though 
defendant had sought and would continue to seek treatment and did 
not understand that society condemned his actions); State v. Bell, 
-36-
not outweigh the aggravating factor of Mr. Gerrish's prior 
conviction. (See Addendum P at 16-22). 
Third, Mr. Gerrish pled guilty "with an exaggerated 
belief in the benefits of his plea." Because of Mr. Hammond's 
erroneous understanding and advice, Mr. Gerrish believed that he 
would serve no more than three years if he pled guilty. (See 
Addendum M at 21-22, 48). But even if the State merely promised 
to recommend a minimum mandatory term of three years and even if 
Mr. Hammond had correctly understood and had clearly conveyed the 
substance of the promise and the fact that it would not bind the 
court to Mr. Gerrish, Mr. Gerrish would still have had "an 
exaggerated belief in the benefit of his plea" because the 
promise was illusory and because the State breached the promise. 
Under these circumstances, Mr. Gerrish's plea must be vacated 
because it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gerrish submits that this Court should reverse the 
decisions of the court of appeals and the district court 
dismissing his habeas corpus petition. Because the record 
establishes that Mr. Gerrish's plea was invalid as a matter of 
law and because Mr. Gerrish has already spent approximately six 
years in prison as a result of that invalid plea, this Court 
754 P.2d 55 (affirming imposition of term of middle severity even 
though defendant, a Vietnam veteran, was a victim of post-
traumatic stress disorder). 
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should vacate his plea and reverse his conviction/ with 
prejudice. At the very least, this Court should reverse the 
decisions of the court of appeals and the district court 
dismissing the habeas corpus petition and then remand the case to 
the district court with instructions to allow amendment of the 
petition and to hold an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of 
considering the petition's merits. 
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